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ABSTRACT. How should we, from an epistemological point of view, understand the role of 
technology in education? On one very natural conception of the epistemic goals of education, 
such technology can only at best play an enabling role, since ultimately the task of education is 
to enhance the unaided cognitive abilities of the subject. This way of conceiving of the 
epistemic goals of education can be compounded once one notices that virtue epistemology 
offers a very natural framework for understanding the epistemology of education. This is 
because virtue epistemology often tacitly incorporates a commitment to epistemic individualism, 
such that one’s cognitive abilities are to be understood exclusively in terms of one’s ‘on-
board’, and thus in this sense ‘internal’, cognitive processes. Hence, when virtue epistemology 
is applied to the epistemology of education, this seems to confirm the idea that technology 
can at best only play a supporting role. It is argued, however, that the virtue epistemology 
framework is in fact entirely compatible with an epistemic anti-individualism which allows 
technology which is outwith the skin of the subject to nonetheless form a constitutive part of 
the subject’s cognitive processes. It is claimed that such an extended virtue epistemology has a 
number of attractive features, and some of its implications for the epistemology of education 
are explored.  
 
 
0. INTRODUCTION  
 
A common cultural battleground when it comes to the education of children concerns 
generational changes in what is taught (and the manner in which it is taught). In the case of the 
United Kingdom, for example, one will often find people of more advanced years bemoaning the 
fact that when they were children they were expected at school to learn to do fairly advanced 
arithmetic entirely in their heads, but that the children of today are encouraged to make full use of 
technology (i.e., calculators, or more commonly these days, computing devices, such as tablets or 
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full-blown desktop computers). The upshot is that the current goals of education are much less 
demanding than they once were.1,2 
 Like many cultural debates, there is a tendency in discussions of this sort to exaggerate the 
differences. Although children today have access to technology that wasn’t available to their 
grandparents, and are often encouraged to make use of this technology, this doesn’t meant that 
they aren’t also expected to be able to solve arithmetical problems entirely in their head. (Equally, 
the presence of technology doesn’t entail that children are no longer expected to be able to solve 
mathematical problems with pen and paper).3 Nonetheless, there is also certainly some truth in 
this generational conflict. 
 A good way of drawing this point out is to note that prior to 1971, when decimalisation was 
introduced, the UK had quite a complex system of currency.4 Rather than the simple base 10 
structure inherent to decimalised currency, pre-decimalised currency incorporated a myriad of 
coins which bore (by base 10 lights anyway) quite unusual relationships to one another. There 
were, for example, 4 farthings in a penny, 2 pennies in a florin, 12 pennies in a shilling, 5 shillings 
in a crown, 20 shillings in a pound, 1 pound and 1 shilling in a guinea, and so on. Given that all 
citizens need to be able to use money, particularly in a (pre-1970s) society which lacks the means 
for electronic transfer of funds, it should come as no surprise that schools in the pre-
decimalisation period put a premium on children being able to do complex arithmetical sums 
entirely in their heads. After all, if one lacked this sort of ability, then one would be severely 
limited in one’s day-to-day activities. It is not feasible to expect someone out shopping to be 
carrying pen and paper to work out whether they are staying within budget (and note that the first 
mass-produced pocket calculators were not available in the UK until the early 1970s).    
 Fast forward to the present day. Decimalisation has made using currency much easier, and 
this has been further helped by the widespread presence of technology to assist whatever 
calculations need to be made. Rather than having to trust the shopkeeper’s calculations when 
working out one’s bill, one can instead rely on an impartial shop till which works out the total for 
both parties. Moreover, often the transfer of funds involves very little more than scanning one’s 
credit or debit card into a machine, and hence in such cases one doesn’t need to work out which 
configuration of decimalised coins⎯let alone pence, shillings, florins, crowns, pounds, guineas 
(etc.,)⎯one requires in order to settle one’s bill. 
 The point of the foregoing is that there can be very practical reasons which influence the 
kinds of core skills that we aim to impart to our children through education. Although I have 
focussed on a case which is specific to the UK, it ought to be clear that across the 
word⎯particularly the developed world, which tends to quickly incorporate new technology into 
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education⎯there have been a range of motivations of this general kind which have altered the 
goals of education. The crux is that given the growth in technology⎯alongside other practical 
developments, such as, in this case, the simplification of a country’s system of currency⎯one 
would expect there to be changes in educational practice which are geared less towards the 
development of a child’s ‘on board’ cognitive resources (i.e., the child’s unaided cognition) and 
more towards the development of the child’s employment of ‘off board’ cognitive resources, 
especially technology.  
 Here is the question: does this shift in educational focus away from developing a child’s on-
board cognitive resources mean that we are expecting a lot less of our children from an 
educational point of view than we once did? I will be arguing that while this line of reasoning can 
look very seductive⎯indeed, irresistible⎯it is nonetheless highly dubious. In fact, I will be 
suggesting that focussing on the real-world cognitive situations that citizens encounter⎯situations 
which are these days laden with technology⎯is entirely the right approach for our educational 
policies to take. Moreover, rather than this representing a ‘dumbing down’ of education, this is in 
fact a demonstration of the flexible nature of education when it is conducted in the right spirit. As 
we will see, key to my defence of these claims will be a certain conception of virtue epistemology 
and its role in determining the epistemic goals of education. In particular, we will be encountering 
the so-called ‘extended cognition’ research programme in the cognitive sciences, and how this 
programme dovetails with the particular variety of virtue epistemology that I set out.5 
 
 
2. VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE EPISTEMIC GOALS OF EDUCATION 
 
Although it has its roots in antiquity, virtue epistemology has only relatively recently become a 
dominant force in epistemology.6 Virtue epistemologists primarily focus on the cognitive character of 
the subject, as opposed to primarily focussing instead on the epistemic status of the subject’s 
doxastic states. This means focussing on the cognitive traits that make up a subject’s cognitive 
character, such as her cognitive abilities and intellectual virtues.7  
 At a bare minimum, such cognitive traits will be stable and reliable belief-forming process 
which are suitably integrated with the subject’s other cognitive traits.8 So construed, a cognitive 
trait is essentially a cognitive skill or ability. But one could build a lot more into the notion of a 
cognitive trait as it is relevant to epistemology. One could demand that such traits must be 
acquired in a certain way (through a process of habituation, for example); one could demand that 
what it takes to integrate a cognitive trait within a subject’s cognitive character requires that the 
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subject undertake a reflective process which epistemically evaluated that trait; one could demand 
that cognitive traits are accompanied by appropriate motivational states (e.g., a love of the truth); 
and so on. In so doing one is moving away from the conception of a cognitive trait qua skill or 
ability and towards the idea of a cognitive trait being a kind of intellectual virtue, in the Aristotelian 
sense.9 
 We do not need to get into this debate here; for our purposes we will understand a cognitive 
trait (/epistemic virtue⎯we will use the two notions interchangeably) in the broadest possible 
way. Those virtue epistemologists of a restrictive bent who solely focus on intellectual virtue will 
(typically anyway) regard the development of mere cognitive ability as a necessary stage towards 
the development of what they regard as epistemic virtue proper. And those virtue epistemologists 
of an inclusive bent who allow mere cognitive abilities to be part of the picture will also (typically, 
anyway) regard the enhancement of one’s cognitive abilities such that they constitute intellectual 
virtues as nonetheless epistemically desirable. We can thus consider virtue epistemology as 
concerned with the development of epistemic virtue in the broadest sense without thereby losing 
too much of the differences between the various kinds of virtue epistemology on offer. 
 Virtue epistemology, so conceived anyway (i.e., broadly), has a natural application to the 
epistemology of education. As opposed to a crude conception of the epistemic goals of education 
which focuses on the child’s acquisition of lots of good epistemic outcomes⎯in particular, lots of 
facts (i.e., true beliefs)⎯virtue epistemology instead urges the cultivation of cognitive character, 
and thus epistemic virtue.10  
 Moreover, virtue epistemologists have an axiological story to tell about the importance of 
epistemic virtue which is directly applicable to the educational context. According to virtue 
epistemology epistemic virtue is valuable not merely instrumentally, as a means to certain 
epistemic goods (such as true belief, which is generally of practical utility), but also non-
instrumentally (i.e., finally). In particular, epistemic virtues, as manifestations of cognitive agency, 
are held to be valuable for their own sake. In addition, epistemic virtues are also held to be, like 
virtues more generally, constituent parts of a life of flourishing which is valuable for its own sake 
(this is of course particularly true of the intellectual virtues). Carried over to the educational 
context, this means that the epistemic and the broadly ethical goals of education start to blur. This 
is because in promoting the epistemic good in an educational context one is thereby developing 
the student’s epistemic virtue, where this is in turn a route to both instrumentally and finally 
valuable goods.11  
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3. EPISTEMIC INDIVIDUALISM/ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM 
 
While virtue epistemology has natural application to the epistemology of education, one might 
think that it also thereby lends itself to a conception of the epistemology of education which is 
resolutely individualistic. That is, it is natural to think of virtue epistemology as a kind of epistemic 
individualism, whereby a subject’s cognitive processes are to be understood as being entirely 
‘internal’ to the subject (‘under the skin’ of the subject, as we may put it). For virtue 
epistemologists, after all, epistemic virtue is key, and epistemic virtues are on the face of it 
‘internal’ to the cognitive subject in just this respect. One’s epistemic virtues are (at least a key part 
of) one’s ‘on board’ cognitive resources.12  
 The alternative to epistemic individualism is epistemic anti-individualism, which argues that a 
subject’s cognitive processes are not entirely ‘internal’ to the subject in this way. According to 
epistemic anti-individualism, our cognitive processes can extend beyond our skins and take in 
environmental factors. We can delineate two main (and potentially overlapping) varieties of such a 
view: a social epistemic anti-individualism, which allows that a subject’s cognitive processes may 
incorporate features of one’s social environment (e.g., one’s study group), and a technological epistemic 
anti-individualism, which allows that a subject’s cognitive processes may incorporate features of 
one’s technological environment.13 As we might (loosely) put the point, the debate between 
epistemic individualists and anti-individualists comes down to whether cognition is ‘in the head.’14  
 If one construes virtue epistemology along epistemic individualist lines then one is led to a 
conception of the epistemology of education in which the focus is on the development of the 
child’s on-board cognitive resources, in the sense of her epistemic virtues, individualistically 
conceived. On this model, while there might be educational merit in making use of technology and 
other environmental crutches in order to aid educational development, this would merely be a 
means to the ultimate end of enhancing the subject’s on-board cognitive resources⎯viz., her 
‘internal’ epistemic virtues. Virtue epistemology, when applied to the epistemology of education, 
thus seems to validate the idea that we should be wary of an over-reliance on technology in 
education, since the ultimate epistemic goal of education is to enhance the internal, and thus 
technologically unaided, cognitive traits of the subject.  
 Note that even on this individualistic way of thinking of the epistemic goals of education, it 
might still be the case that one ought to generally favour teaching children how to make difficult 
arithmetical calculations using calculators rather than in their head. For one thing, the cognitive 
abilities involved in using technology are themselves important on-board cognitive resources, even 
while they involve the implementation of resources which are outwith the skin of the agent. 
Moreover, the epistemic goals of education are only part of the entire story of what education is 
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about. Education is meant to serve practical ends too, and in a society where technological aids of 
the relevant kind are common, enhancing a subject’s arithmetical skills beyond a certain point may 
be without practical import. 
 Even so, the point remains that if one combines virtue epistemology with epistemic 
individualism, then one is led to a conception of the epistemic good of education which treats the 
development of the subject’s on-board cognitive resources as central. Returning to the question 
about teaching children to do arithmetic in their heads rather than by using other methods (pen 
and paper, calculators, etc.,), the moral is clear: ceteris paribus, and from a purely epistemic point of 
view at least, one should favour educational methods which develop the ‘in the head’ process of 
doing arithmetic over other processes which are technology-assisted. 
 Is there an alternative way of conceiving of virtue epistemology in this regard? I believe 
there is. In particular, while virtue epistemologists tend to ally themselves with epistemic 
individualism, I do not think there is any essential reason why they should. Moreover, I think that 
their position actually looks rather more attractive when construed along epistemic anti-
individualistic lines. Although I think both social and technological forms of epistemic anti-
individualism are viable, I will here focus specifically on technological epistemic anti-individualism.   
 In order to see how virtue epistemology might be allied to epistemic anti-individualism of 
this type, it will be useful to first reflect on educational practices and work back from there to what 
a virtue epistemology cast along these lines might look like. 
 
 
4. SCAFFOLDING IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY 
 
A common metaphor that is used in educational theory is that of ‘scaffolding’.15 The educator is 
concerned to create the conditions under which the student can learn, where this is the temporary 
scaffold against which educational goals can be attained. So, for example, a teacher would not 
teach a student a new language by introducing the student to lots of new and complex vocabulary, 
but would instead begin with very simple exercises and build up to more difficult material. Along 
the way, the teacher is facilitating the learning on the part of the student by using their expertise to 
judge just how much the student can manage on each occasion (i.e., enough to ‘push’ the student, 
but not so much as to overwhelm and discourage them).   
 The scaffolding metaphor is apt, since the whole point of scaffolding is that once it serves 
its purpose it is taken down and the structure can stand on its own two feet once more. So 
construed, the metaphor would seem to speak in favour of epistemic individualism. The 
educator⎯and, through the educator, technology and other aids⎯is a kind of epistemic ‘crutch’ 
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who enables the student to develop their cognitive abilities. Once this development has achieved 
its end, however, the crutch is removed and what is left is the educated agent with their more 
sophisticated cognitive abilities. Crucially, since the crutch has now been removed, the agent’s 
developed cognitive abilities are entirely self-standing⎯what has been achieved by education is the 
development of the purely on-board, and thus internal, cognitive processes of the subject.  
 There is a different way of thinking about the scaffolding metaphor, however, which fits 
better with epistemic anti-individualism rather than epistemic individualism. For think about how 
scaffolding is actually employed. Think, for example, of the scaffolding employed in, say, the 
construction of a bridge over a gorge. Here the scaffolding, while still temporary, enables a 
structure to be built (which couldn’t otherwise be built, or with much more difficulty anyway) 
which when completed spans from one side of the gorge to another, and thereby forges a 
permanent connection between two previously unconnected bodies of land.  
 Following through on the metaphor, we can distinguish between two kinds of scaffolding. 
The first, which we’ll call non-extended scaffolding, supports the development of purely ‘internal’ 
cognitive processes, such that the scaffolding is indeed nothing more than a temporary epistemic 
crutch. The second, in contrast, supports ‘extended’ cognitive processes⎯let’s call this extended 
scaffolding. In terms of the latter, we can envisage educational scaffolding which functions like the 
scaffolding at work in the building of a bridge over a river gorge, in that it facilitates the creation 
of cognitive processes which extend beyond the skin of the subject and involve ‘external’ 
technology (and possibly other epistemic agents, where the extended cognitive process is of a 
social variety) Indeed, I think that quite often the use of technology and social factors to facilitate 
scaffolding in an educational context is of this latter, extended, sort.  
 Think about the case of arithmetic again. Here is an example of non-extended scaffolding in 
action. The teacher constructs sums on the whiteboard in an effort to demonstrate to the child in 
an accessible way how to do basic arithmetic. In time the child develops the ability to do these 
sums by themselves⎯such as on a whiteboard or with pen and paper⎯and ultimately to do the 
sums in their head. Eventually, the child develops the means to do fairly complex arithmetic in this 
way. Here the use of technology⎯in this case the whiteboard, and to a lesser extent pens and 
paper⎯is a mere epistemic crutch to aid the student’s development of their own on-board 
cognitive capacities.  
 Contrast this case with a student who is initially taught to do basic arithmetic in the very 
same way⎯so that they have a grip on the nature of arithmetic (i.e., what is involved in adding, 
subtracting, multiplication, and so forth)⎯but who is subsequently encouraged to use, as the 
calculations become complex, a computing device (i.e., a calculator, tablet etc.,). Moreover, 
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imagine that the reason they are being taught in this way is that such computing devices are 
entirely common features of their cognitive environment, such that they can reasonably rely on 
their presence in normal cognitive conditions. (This is pretty much the situation in the developed 
world today as most people have ready access to this level of computing⎯e.g., on their mobile 
phones, which most people carry around with them).  
 In both cases the scaffolding leads to the development of the student’s on-board cognitive 
capacities⎯viz., their ability to undertake basic arithmetic. But whereas the first form of 
scaffolding is ultimately designed only to develop the student’s on-board cognitive capacities, the 
latter form of scaffolding takes a different direction entirely. In particular, while the technology 
employed in the first case is merely a means to an end, and so becomes over time incidental to the 
cognitive process at issue, the technology employed in the second case remains a key part of the 
resultant cognitive process. Moreover, notice that this is by design and reflects the nature of the 
cognitive environment which the subject inhabits.  
 The first form of scaffolding is thus of the non-extended variety, while the second is a form 
of extended scaffolding. In both cases, there is a sense in which the scaffolding is temporary. In 
the first case, this is straightforward, in that the technology introduced by the educator goes from 
being an essential part of the cognitive process to being an inessential part. The second case is very 
different, in that the technology remains a central part of the cognitive process. But this is because 
in the second case the technology is a core part of the extended cognitive process that is being 
facilitated by the scaffolding. The technology itself is thus not part of the scaffolding in this case. 
Instead, it is rather the specific way in which the technology is introduced by the educator which is 
the scaffolding.16    
 
 
5. EXTENDED COGNITION AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF EDUCATION 
 
We can thus distinguish between extended and non-extended cognitive processes, where the use 
of extended scaffolding in an educational context is specifically designed to enhance cognitive 
processes of the former type. It is an interesting question what, exactly, marks the difference 
between an extended and a non-extended cognitive process. When is a subject’s use of an 
instrument just that, and when does the instrument instead become a proper part of the cognitive 
process? But we can set such demarcation issues to one side for our purposes. The point is that 
there are cognitive processes which are quite naturally construed as being extended in this way, 
and that in concert with this we can also envisage a particular kind of educational process which 
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would be devoted to creating such an extended cognitive process.  
 Of course, any virtue epistemologist who explicitly endorses epistemic individualism is 
thereby committed to rejecting extended cognitive processes, and hence they are also obliged to 
dispute the idea that there could be such a thing as extended scaffolding in educational practice. 
Presumably, the way they would approach any putative case offered of extended scaffolding would 
be to insist that what really counts is the development of the subject’s on-board cognitive 
processes, and in this way re-characterise such a case as being instead a variety of non-extended 
scaffolding. So, for instance, in the example of extended (on my view) scaffolding just given they 
could argue that what is in fact being developed here is just the subject’s on-board cognitive 
capacity for using technology in a certain way.  
 But while the combination of virtue epistemology and epistemic individualism is 
undoubtedly in principle at least a live theoretical option, there are also various difficulties with 
this approach. In particular, there are difficulties with this approach that don’t afflict the 
combination of virtue epistemology and epistemic anti-individualism. Thus, given that the alliance 
between virtue epistemology and epistemic individualism is largely a tacit one⎯in that it is not 
argued for, but merely presupposed⎯one might well wonder why virtue epistemologists should 
be so keen to retain this commitment once it is made explicit.    
 One problem which faces the combination of virtue epistemology and epistemic 
individualism concerns the variety of virtue epistemology in play. For as I have argued at length 
elsewhere, while virtue epistemology in general might be in principle compatible with epistemic 
individualism, a particular popular version of virtue epistemology⎯what I refer to as robust virtue 
epistemology, which is defended in one form or another by Ernest Sosa (1988; 1991; 2007; 2009), 
Linda Zagzebski (1996; 1999), and John Greco (2003; 2007; 2009), amongst others⎯is almost 
certainly untenable if allied to epistemic individualism.17 At best, then, it is only a particular kind of 
virtue epistemology⎯one that hasn’t been as influential in the recent literature as robust virtue 
epistemology⎯which is compatible with epistemic individualism.18  
 Even setting these concerns to one side, a further difficulty remains for this individualistic 
way of conceiving of virtue epistemology, which is that it pits virtue epistemology against a 
popular trend of contemporary cognitive science. In particular, it is increasingly common in the 
cognitive sciences to view cognitive processes as extended in various ways, such that we should 
conceive of factors beyond the skin of the agent⎯in particular, technology, at least where the 
technology is widely available to the subject and easily accessible⎯as constitutive parts of the 
subject’s cognitive processes. To take one of many examples from the literature, the way one’s 
memory functions is very different if one has ready access to environmental factors (such as 
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technology, or other informants) which makes information that one would otherwise need to 
recall easily accessible. In such a case, the subject in effect ‘off-loads’ part of their cognitive 
process onto the technology, and in so doing is able to ‘remember’ a far greater body of 
information than before (i.e., when they relied only on their on-board cognition).19  
 There is plenty of empirical evidence that it is in the nature of the development of human 
cognition (and perhaps not only human cognition) that it involves the ‘off-loading’ of cognitive 
resources onto factors in one’s environment in this way. Indeed, one can view the development of 
something so basic to our cognition as language as being driven by the need for such cognitive 
off-loading.20 If virtue epistemology wishes to deny extended cognition then it puts itself at odds 
with a vibrant and progressive research programme in the cognitive sciences, and this is not a 
comfortable place for an epistemology of our cognitive processes to be.  
 But the most telling count against individualistic virtue epistemology on this score is not the 
fact that it is tension with a leading movement in contemporary cognitive science, but rather that 
there is no principled reason for virtue epistemology to not be cast along extended cognition lines. 
The core idea of virtue epistemology, recall, is that we should focus on the cognitive character, and 
thus the epistemic virtues, of the subject. This core idea entails, for example, that when a subject 
attains a cognitive good, such as knowledge, then her cognitive success ought to be significantly 
creditable to her cognitive agency. But that there is nothing in this story which precludes the idea 
that cognitive processes, and thus the cognitive subject, extends beyond the skin of the agent.  
 In order to see this, consider again the student in our example of extended scaffolding 
above. Once the student has mastered the use of the technology in question, we are to think of the 
cognitive processes in play as genuinely extended, such that they include the technology employed. 
But it does not follow from this fact that the subject’s cognitive successes in this regard are no 
longer significantly attributable to the exercise of her cognitive agency. In particular, what we need 
to remember is that the successes produced by the extended cognitive processes are no less 
attributable to the subject’s cognitive agency than the successes produced by her non-extended 
cognitive processes. It follows that that virtue epistemologists can consistently endorse extended 
cognition while nonetheless retaining their core commitment to the idea that a subject’s 
acquisition of a cognitive good involves cognitive successes which are significantly attributable to 
her cognitive agency.  
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We have thus argued that virtue epistemology is entirely compatible with an extended conception 
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of cognitive processes, and that there are a number of benefits of construing virtue epistemology 
this way, not least that it conforms with a dominant trend in contemporary cognitive science. 
Where does this leave us with the question on which we began⎯viz., whether the use of 
technology in education by its nature constitutes a ‘dumbing down’ of educational goals? 
 I think it ought to be clear that this debate as it is usually understood effectively 
presupposes a conception of cognitive processes which is essentially individualistic. On this way of 
thinking about cognitive processes, it is inevitable that educational practices which involve a 
dependency on the part of the student on technology can lead to a lessening of the student’s 
cognitive powers, since on this view those powers are understood exclusively in terms of the on-
board internal cognitive resources of the agent. On an extended view of cognitive processes, in 
contrast, the matter is much more complex. For on this proposal, one can, in the right 
circumstances at least, think of a subject’s cognitive processes as being enhanced by technology.21  
 This way of conceiving of education has other important implications, and I want to close 
by flagging one of them. For notice that the debate between an extended versus a non-extended 
conception of the epistemic goals of education has an important bearing not only on the way in 
which we should teach students new skills and knowledge, but also on the way in which we should 
assess their educational performance. On a non-extended view of the epistemology of education, 
given that one ultimately aims to enhance the internal cognitive processes of the subject, 
educational assessments should ideally be done ‘solo’⎯i.e., such that the student does not have 
access to technology. In contrast, where the educational goal is explicitly to enhance a student’s 
extended cognition, then an educational assessment which involves technology could be an 
optimal way of evaluating educational process.22,23 
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NOTES 
 
1  Note that where I talk without qualification about ‘education’ I will have in mind the education of children 
specifically (and not, for example, the kind of ‘higher’ education which takes placed in the University system).  
2  This debate about educational goals is mirrored in a more general public debate about whether technology, and the 
internet in particular, is making us dumber. See, for example, Carr (2010), which was an international bestseller. I 
comment on this more general public debate below⎯see endnote 21. 
3  Indeed, it is worth remembering that, strictly speaking, pen and paper is itself a form of technology in the broad 
sense of that term (i.e., tools designed and created to solve a particular kind of practical problem). So construed, our 
current reliance on technology in education differs in degree rather than kind from the level of technological reliance 
on display in previous generations.  
4  The UK still for the most part employs an imperial system of weights and measures, alongside a much simpler 
metric system (of a kind employed in continental Europe).  
5  Note that although we are focusing on the increasing use of technology in education, similar points apply to an 
increasing dependence in education on the student’s social environment (e.g., group work), including their social-cum-
technological environment (e.g., the use of technology like Google which effectively increases the range of available 
informants). Much of what I will be arguing about the employment of technology in education will apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to an educational reliance on a student’s social environment, though for reasons of space I will not be 
drawing out these implications in this piece.  
6  Thanks largely to the seminal work of Sosa (e.g., 1988; 1991; 2007; 2009). 
7  Henceforth, when I talk of ‘cognitive traits’ I will specifically have in mind those cognitive traits which can form 
part of a subject’s cognitive character (as opposed to a broader conception of a cognitive trait, typically operative in 
the cognitive sciences, on which any cognitive process by which the subject gains a purchase on reality, whatever its 
epistemic pedigree, constitutes a cognitive trait).  
8  Actually, cognitive traits needn’t have outputs which are beliefs, specifically. One could, for example, conceive of 
cognitive traits which reliably generate other propositional attitudes, such as acceptance. I take it, however, that the 
fundamental role of cognitive traits is to generate beliefs. So, for example, a scientist working in a highly theoretical 
domain where the results of scientific investigation are particularly provisional might well properly accept a claim that 
it wouldn’t be appropriate for them to believe. But the scientist’s judgements about what to accept will be nonetheless 
importantly responsive to her beliefs; indeed, it is presumably because of her accurate beliefs about the nature of the 
domain⎯formed via her reliable cognitive traits⎯that she will opt to merely accept the scientific claim in question as 
opposed to believing it.  
9  For an example of a very minimal virtue epistemology which is cast along broadly reliabilist lines, see the agent 
reliabilist position defended in early work by Greco (1999; 2000). For a very different neo-Aristotelian virtue-theoretic 
proposal which incorporates responsibilist elements, see Zagzebski (1996). For an excellent overview of contemporary 
virtue epistemology, see Axtell (1997). 
10  That education should be focused on the development of what we are here calling epistemic virtues rather than the 
mere transmission of good epistemic outputs (like facts) is a familiar point in the philosophy of education. In a recent 
survey piece on the epistemic ends of education, for example, Robertson (2009, §1) writes, citing Siegel (1988) and 
Elgin (1996; cf. Elgin 1999a; 1999b), that “the goal [of education] is not information per se, but, rather, knowledge that is 
significant and organized in patterns that contribute to perspective and understanding in orienting thought and 
action.” I offer my own virtue-theoretic take on the epistemology of education in Pritchard (2013). See also 
MacAllister (2012).  
11  For a recent survey on the contemporary debate about epistemic value, which deals extensively with the 
contributions to that debate from virtue epistemology, see Pritchard & Turri (2011). See also Pritchard (2007; 2009a; 
2009b) and Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 1-4).   
12  Here, for example, is Goldman, in a seminal work in epistemology: 
“Clearly, the causal ancestry of beliefs often includes events outside the organism. Are such events to be 
included among the “inputs” of belief-forming processes? Or should we restrict the extent of belief-forming 
processes to “cognitive” events, i.e., events within the organism’s nervous system?” (Goldman 1979, §2; 
italics in original)  
After choosing the second option, Goldman explains that epistemic standings like knowledge result from cognitive 
operations and that ““cognitive” operations are most plausibly construed as operations of the cognitive faculties, i.e., 
“information-processing” equipment internal to the organism.” (Goldman 1979, §2; italics in original) In later work 
Goldman reiterates his endorsement of epistemic individualism: 
“One thing we do not want to do is invoke factors external to the cognizer’s psychology. The sorts of 
processes we’re discussing are purely internal processes.” (Goldman 1986, 51) 
Goldman is far from being alone in taking epistemic individualism as given in his understanding of cognitive 
processes. Sosa, for example, understands cognitive abilities in terms of what he calls ‘competences’, which he 
characterizes, in line with epistemic individualism, as follows: 
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“[A] competence is a disposition, one with its basis resident in the competent agent, one that would in 
appropriately normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the success of any relevant performance 
issued by it.” (Sosa 2007, 29) 
13  I discuss epistemic individualism/anti-individualism in further detail in Kallestrup & Pritchard (2012; 2013). See 
also Goldberg (2010; 2011; 2012).  
14  Or, at any rate, ‘in the head and central nervous system’ (i.e., under the skin). Note that allowing that cognitive 
processes can extend beyond the skin of the agent is not yet to endorse the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis, as 
famously defended by Clark & Chalmers (1998). Indeed, as Clark & Chalmers (1998) themselves make clear, while 
extended cognition/knowledge implies the extended mind thesis, it needs to be supplemented with further claims in 
order to entail it. For more on the epistemic ramifications of the extended cognition and extended mind theses, see 
Pritchard (2010), Palermos (2011), Vaesen (2011), Adams (2012), Aizawa (2012), Goldberg (2012), Green (2012), 
Kirchhoff & Newsome (2012), Menary (2012), Hetherington (2012), and Roberts (2012).  
15  This notion is often credited to Vygotsky’s (e.g., 1978) influential educational theory, though he never actually used 
this particular terminology. See in particular his notion of the zone of proximal development, which effectively involves 
educators creating favourable learning conditions for their pupils, a process which in the contemporary educational 
literature is often called ‘scaffolding’. For a useful recent overview of Vygotsky’s educational theory, see Davydov & 
Kerr (1995). For more on scaffolding in educational theory more specifically, see Wood & Middleton (1975) and 
Simons & Klein (2007). For a helpful overview of how scaffolding is used in the specific context of language 
education, see Foley (1994).  
16  Note that the notion of scaffolding has recently been independently employed in the extended mind/cognition 
literature. See, especially, Sterelny (2010). While Sterelny’s account of cognitive scaffolding is more specific than the 
notion of extended scaffolding offered here, they are broadly similar.  
17  See especially Kallestrup & Pritchard (2012; 2013). For a more general critique of robust virtue epistemology, of 
which this complaint forms one key part, see Pritchard (2009; 2012), Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 1-4), 
and Kallestrup & Pritchard (forthcoming). 
18  Elsewhere I have described the virtue-theoretic proposal in question as modest virtue epistemology. See, for example, 
Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 1-4). 
19  For a very helpful overview of the scientific literature in this regard, particular with regard to socially extended 
cognition, see Sutton et al (2010). For a survey of a recent scientific study regarding memory and technology, see 
Sparrow, Liu & Wegner (2011). Although this piece doesn’t extract the extended cognition moral, the results it 
describes are amendable to such a reading, as explained in Wheeler (2011). 
20  See, for example, Wheeler (2004).  
21  What goes for the epistemic goals of education on this front applies, mutatis mutandis, to the more general issue 
about whether our reliance on technology inevitably leads to a deterioration in our cognitive abilities, as popularly 
expounded by Carr (2010), Greenfield (2013), and others. See Wheeler (2011) for more on this point.  
22  See Wheeler (2011, §3) for further discussion of this issue. 
23  This paper was written as part of the AHRC-funded ‘Extended Knowledge’ project which is hosted by the 
University of Edinburgh’s Eidyn Philosophical Research Centre, and I am grateful to the AHRC for their support of 
this research. Special thanks to Orestis Palermos for detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper. Thanks 
also to Ben Kotzee, Chienkuo Mi, John Ravenscroft, and Mike Wheeler.  
